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THE INFLUENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA ON
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF SENTENCE
IN a criminal proceeding, a defendant may plead guilty with the expectation
of thereby obtaining reduced punishment for his criminal conduct.1 Prosecut-
ing attorneys will often seek a less severe sentence for an accused who does not
insist guilt be proven at trial.2 The influence of the guilty plea on a prosecutor,
and the factors motivating his attitude, are well-explored features of modern
criminal administration. 3 However, commentators have not emphasized the
effect of a guilty plea upon a judge vested with discretion in sentencing a
defendant. A recent survey by the Yale Law Journal indicates that many
judges will give a defendant pleading guilty of a crime a less severe sentence
than an accused who has been tried and found guilty of the same offense.
4
Such a practice may co-exist and interact with the concessions accorded by
prosecutors to defendants who plead guilty.5
THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE PROSECUTOR
As the public representative responsible for prosecution of all criminal
offenders, 6 the prosecuting attorney utilizes the guilty plea as an administra-
1. See, e.g., United States v. Domroe, 129 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1942); Hudspeth v.
State, 188 Ark. 323, 67 S.W.2d 191 (1933), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 642 (1935); In the
Matter of Sabongy, 18 N.J. Super. 334, 87 A.2d 59 (L. 1952); In re Smith, 162 Ohio
St. 58, 120 N.E.2d 736 (1954); Sadler v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 516, 105 S.W.2d 1099
(1937).
2. See Ward v. United States, 116 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1940); People v. Ventura,
415 Ill. 587, 114 N.E.2d 710 (1953); Hobson v. Youell, 177 Va. 906, 914-15, 15 S.E.2d
76, 79 (1941).
Prosecutors may sometimes repudiate their obligation to seek more lenient treatment
for a defendant who pleads guilty. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 241 Iowa 670, 42 N.W.2d
79 (1950). Under these circumstances a trial court may be reversed if it refuses to ex-
ercise its discretion to allow a guilty plea to be withdrawn. Note, 64 YALE L.j. 590, 594-95
(1955) (federal courts) ; People v. Barnes, 285 App. Div. 1067, 139 N.Y.S.2d 546 (2d
Dep't 1955) ; see People v. King, 1 111. 2d 496, 116 N.E.2d 623 (1953). But see State v.
Pometti, 23 N.J. Super. 516, 93 A.2d 409 (App. Div. 1952), aff'd on other grounds, 12
N.J. 446, 97 A.2d 399 (1953).
3. E.g., Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL.. L. REv. 385, 392
(1951) ; Hobbs, Prosecutor's Bias, An Occupational Disease, 2 ALA. L. REv. 40, 41 (1949) ;
Weintraub & Tough, Lesser Pleas Considered, 32 J. CRima. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 506 (1939) ;
Note, The Nolle Prosequi and the Lesser Plea, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 407 (1948).
4. See text at notes 17-20 infra.
Other empirical evidence supports the conclusion that courts are inclined to treat
defendants pleading guilty more leniently. See, e.g., ILLNOIS CRIm t StmvEy 84 (1929)
("[T]he chances of getting probation are roughly two and one-half times as great if one
pleads guilty to begin with as they are if one pleads not guilty and sticks to it.") ; Newman,
Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.
780, 784 (1956).
5. See text at notes 21-22 infra.
6. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 507 (1952) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 3362 (Supp. 1955) ; MicH.
STAT. ANN. c. 39, § 5.751 (Supp. 1955).
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tive tool.7 If forced to prove the guilt of every defendant in a judicial proceed-
ing, the prosecutor, with his limited staff and budget, would be hampered in
his enforcement of criminal law.8 Accordingly, he must secure a waiver of
the accused's constitutional right to trial by offering the inducement of more
lenient punishment for his criminal acts.9
The prosecutor desirous of obtaining guilty pleas may influence the extent
of the punishment meted out to the defendant in two different ways. He may
request the sentencing judge to award a lenient punishment to a defendant
pleading guilty to the crime for which he was indicted.10 Or the prosecutor
may permit the defendant to plead guilty to an offense entailing less severe
punishment than the crime charged in the initial indictment.1 These methods
are not equally advantageous to the defendant. An accused who relies upon
the prosecutor's request for mercy incurs the risk that the prosecutor may
7. Commentators have emphasized other reasons why prosecutors favor the guilty
plea in addition to its contribution to efficient criminal administration. Among these
reasons are a desire to achieve an impressive record of convictions and a realization
that a conviction at trial is not a certainty regardless of the strength of the prosecutor's
case. DEsSION, CRIMINAL LAW ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER 374-75 (1948);
see, generally, Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 So. CALIF. L. REv. 1, 16-22
(1927).
8. Note, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 407, 409 (1948); see Note, Prosecutors' Discretion, 103
U. PA. L. REv. 1057, 1070 (1955).
9. A guilty plea is itself a conviction. E.g., Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220,
223 (1927) ; United States v. Swaggerty, 218 F.2d 875, 880 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 959 (1955); Harrell v. Scheidt, 243 N.C. 735, 744, 92 S.E.2d 182, 188 (1956).
Hence the prosecutor need introduce no further evidence after a guilty plea has been
entered. E.g., Waley v. United States, 233 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Tyler v. Warden,
206 Md. 635, 109 A.2d 919 (1954) ; People v. Mason, 307 N.Y. 570, 122 N.E.2d 916 (1954).
10. Ward v. United States, 116 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1940) ; People v. Ventura, 415 Ill.
587, 114 N.E2d 710 (1953); Winchester v. Waters, 97 Okla. Crim. 337, 263 P.2d 535
(1953) ; see Newman, supra note 4, at 787-88.
11. See People v. Schoenhardt, 206 Misc. 946, 948, 135 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732 (County
Ct 1954) ; see, generally, Newman, supra note 4, at 787; Note, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 407 (1948).
The various types of assault and battery exemplify statutory classifications enabling
pleas to lesser included offenses. For example, in Pennsylvania there are four kinds of
assaults defined: assault and battery, punishable by a fine of not more than $1000 and/or
imprisonment up to two years, PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 18, § 4708 (Supp. 1955) ; aggravated
assault and battery, punishable by a fine of not more than $2000 and/or imprisonment up
to three years, id. § 4709; assault with intent to maim, punishable by a fine of not more
than $2000 and/or imprisonment up to five years, id. § 4712; assault with intent to kill,
punishable by a fine of not more than $3000 and/or imprisonment up to seven years,
id. § 4710.
The willingness of the prosecutor to accept a plea to a lesser offense may be predicated
upon the greater difficulty of proof of the more aggravated charge. See DESSION, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 375.
Sometimes a prosecutor will drop one count of a multi-count indictment rather than
allow a plea to a less serious offense than that originally charged. Newman, supra note
4, at 787; see also United States v. Paolantonio, Crim. No. 9049, D. Conn., Jan. 1955;
United States v. Santos, Crim. No. 8996, D. Conn., Sept. 24, 1954.
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later breach his promise to seek a reduced sentence.1 2 Moreover, the court
may not heed the prosecutor's appeal for lenient treatment of the accused.
13
A defendant who, in return for the prosecutor's promise of a reduced sentence,
pleads guilty to a felony indictment forecloses the chance of having the charge
against him decreased to a misdemeanor; as a convicted felon, he incurs civil
disabilities 14 and increases the likelihood of being subjected to future punish-
ment under multiple offender statutes.15 A defendant pleading guilty to a
lesser offense does not bear the risk of a future change of heart by the prose-
cutor; the major obstacle he faces is the court's refusal to allow such a plea
after the plea of not guilty to the original indictment.16
THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE COURT
The concessions accorded by prosecutors to a defendant who pleads guilty
are not the only sentencing advantages he may expect to receive. A Question-
naire sent by the Yale Law Journal to every federal district judge reveals that
66 per cent of the 140 judges replying consider the defendant's plea a relevant
factor in local sentencing procedure.17 87 per cent of the judges who acknowl-
12. See note 2 supra.
13. See, e.g., Clemons v. United States, 137 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 1943); People
v. Hancasky, 410 Ill. 148, 101 N.E.2d 575 (1951); Maxwell v. State, 292 P.2d 181, 184
(Okla. Crim. App. 1956).
14. One convicted of a felony may not be able to vote, serve on a jury, engage in
professions such as medicine or law or hold a civil service job with the federal govern-
ment. Note, 37 VA. L. REv. 105, 110-11 (1951); see, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2961.01
(Supp. 1956); State ex rel. Att'y General v. Irby, 190 Ark. 786, 81 S.W.2d 419, cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 616 (1935).
15. Multiple offender statutes designate increased punishment for defendants already
convicted of a given number of felonies. These laws exist in one form or another in most
American jurisdictions. Note, Court Treatment of General Recidivist Statutes, 48 COLUM.
L. REv. 238, 239 (1948). See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-2514 (Supp. 1955) (five years to
life on the third felony conviction) ; N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1942 (a fifteen year minimum for
a fourth felony) ; CODE OF VA. ANN. § 53-296 (Supp. 1956) (unlimited additional im-
prisonment on third felony conviction).
Habitual offenders' statutes have frequently been attacked on the constitutional basis of
double jeopardy for the former offense. But this argument is countered with the con-
tention that the prior criminal acts are not being penalized again but rather that their
commission represents an aggravating circumstance of the last crime. Note, 48 CoLUM.
L. RFv. 238, 241 (1948) (citing cases).
16. Courts have discretion to forbid the defendant from changing his plea of not
guilty to guilty. Matz v. People, 291 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1956) (plea of not guilty could
not be withdrawn) ; Commonwealth v. Giacomazza, 311 Mass. 456, 466, 42 N.E.2d 506,
512 (1942) ; People v. Banning, 329 Mich. 1, 6-7, 44 N.Wf2d 841, 844 (1950) ; see FED.
R. Clm. P. 11. But see Ex parte Mougell, 96 Okla. Crim. 354, 355, 255 P2d 297, 298
(1953).
17. A Yale Law Journal Questionnaire (hereinafter cited as QUESTIONNAIRE) was
sent to all 240 federal district judges. 143 of these Questionnaires were returned but 3
were left unanswered. The returned Questionnaires are on file in the Yale Law Library.
There were 93 affirmative answers to the following question:
"When there is no mandatory sentence for the crime or the particular criminal,
and the court has authority to vary the sentence, is it accepted practice to take into
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edged that the plea was germane indicated that a defendant pleading guilty
to a crime was given a more lenient punishment than a defendant who pleaded
not guilty.' 8 The estimates of the extent to which the fine or prison term was
diminished for a defendant pleading guilty varied from 10 to 95 per cent of
the punishment which would ordinarily be given after trial and conviction.'
Moreover, 56 per cent of the judges who answered the Questionnaire indicated
that attorneys for the accused, when arguing prior to sentencing, stressed the
fact that their clients had pleaded guilty.
20
The tendency of courts to award less severe punishment following guilty
pleas introduces the possibility of a defendant's obtaining dual sentencing
consideration the fact that the person to be sentenced pleaded guilty, rather than
not guilty?"
Considerable regional variations were disclosed. The regions in the following break-
down are adopted from the COLUMBrA ENcYc. 2039 (2d ed. 1950). The following
analysis gives the number of judges replying from each region together with the per-
centage of them who considered the plea a factor in sentencing: New England: 4; 75%;
Middle Atlantic: 30; 90%; Southeastern: 18; 33%; South: 12; 58%; Great Lakes: 22;
73%; Trans-Mississippi West: 9; 67%; Great Plains and Western Mountains: 13; 31%;
Northwest: 20; 70%; Territories and District of Columbia: 12; 83%.
Though the Yale Law Journal did not attempt a complete poll of state judges, it
sent the Questionnaire to the 20 Superior Court judges in Connecticut. Of the 9 responses
received, 8 judges indicated that the plea was considered a relevant factor in sentencing
in the Superior Courts. The results of this survey are hereinafter referred to as State
Questionnaire.
18. There were 81 affirmative responses to the following question:
"If the answer to [the question printed in note 17 supra] is 'Yes,' is it accepted
practice to give less severe sentences if the person pleaded guilty, rather than not
guilty?"
All 8 judges who indicated on the State Questionnaire that the plea was relevant in
determining sentence answered "Yes," to the above question.
19. Most judges who indicated that the punishment was reduced following a guilty
plea did not answer the following question:
"If your answer to [the question printed in note 18 supra] is 'Yes,' by what
percentage do you estimate that the fine or prison term is usually diminished?"
A few judges stated that the weight given a guilty plea varied from case to case.
Others asserted that meaningful estimate of the reduction in sentence attributable to
the plea was impossible because of the intermingling of the plea with other factors.
The following percentages were supplied by the judges who answered the above
question: one 10%; five 20%; six 25%,' one 30%; three 33%%; one 33%-50%; three 50%;
one 75%; one 80%; two 90%; one 95%.' See QuEsTioNmRnaEs.
20. There were 78 affirmative replies to the'following question:
"Is it the practice of attorneys for an accused person, when arguing prior to
sentencing, to stress the fact that their client has pleaded guilty?"
In addition to the unqualified affirmative answers a few judges replied that while attorneys
did not commonly stress the guilty plea, on occasion they might do so.
Rarely, however, does the district attorney point to a defendant's unwillingness to
plead guilty as a reason for the imposition of a severe sentence. There were only 30 affirma-
tive replies to the following question:
"Is it the practice of the district attorney at the pre-sentence hearing to stress
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advantages. As already indicated, a prosecutor will frequently allow an
accused to plead guilty to an offense punishable by a lower maximum sentence
than that provided for the crime initially charged. 21 Such a defendant may
parlay this concession by enjoying the benefit of a lenient judicial sentence
for the crime to which he has actually pleaded guilty. For the results of
the Questionnaire indicate that judges who give reduced sentences following
guilty pleas do not take into consideration whether the defendant was origi-
nally indicted for a more serious crime.2 2 This combination of advantages
accorded by prosecutors and judges results in a paradox: a defendant origi-
nally indicted for the more serious of two related crimes may, by obtaining
the dual benefits of a guilty plea, incur less severe punishment than a defend-
ant indicted only for the less serious offense and proven guilty at trial.
The inclination of courts to reduce sentence for defendants pleading guilty
is an additional factor influencing the relative advantages to the accused
of the two methods of compromise with the prosecutor. A defendant pleading
guilty to the initial indictment in return for the prosecutor's promise to seek
a more lenient sentence may receive little benefit from this form of bargain.
the fact that the convicted person pleaded not guilty and was found guilty by a
jury?"
Some judges who said that the district attorney did not stress the plea indicated that
he did not even appear at the hearing.
It should be noted that a court's discretion to determine punishment following a con-
viction may be limited by the indeterminate sentence laws existing in most jurisdictions.
See, generally, Note, 50 HARv. L. REv. 677 (1937). Yet, even under indeterminate
sentence laws the court will frequently have authority to establish minimum and maximum
periods of imprisonment. E.g., IL- ANN. STAT. c. 38, §§ 801, 802 (Supp. 1955); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 1057 (Supp. 1955).
Another limit on judicial sentencing discretion in some states is that under certain
circumstances the jury determines the punishment. See REv. CODE MONT. ANN. § 94-7411
(Supp. 1955); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 926 (Supp. 1955). But see, e.g., Canon v.
State, 296 P.2d 202 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956) (court must set punishment if accused pleads
guilty); Baker v. State, 295 P.2d 294 (Okla. Crim App. 1956) (same).
Another check on judicial sentencing discretion is that some states establish a fixed
punishment for certain offenses. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, § 113-4 (Supp. 1955)
(death for murder in the first degree unless the jury recommends life imprisonment).
21. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
22. The following question was asked on 66% of the Questionnaires:
"In determining sentence, is it accepted practice to give a greater punishment
to a defendant who, with the prosecutor's permission, has pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense than charged in the initial indictment, than to a defendant who has pleaded
guilty to the same lesser offense but who was not originally indicted for a more
serious crime ?"
82 Qutestionnaires were returned on which this question had been asked. Of the 62
answers provided, 7 were "Yes," and 55 "No." On the State Questionnaire 2 judges
answered "Yes," and 5 "No."
While the practice of allowing pleas to a lesser offense is apparently not prevalent in
the federal courts, see Criminal Docket of the District of Connecticut; QUESTIONNAIRES,
frequently one or more counts will be dropped so that the effect of a lesser plea can be
achieved. See note 11 supra.
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Since a judge will probably reduce sentence following a guilty plea even in
the absence of an appeal for mercy, not only may such a request be super-
fluous, 23 but also the prosecutor may fail to honor his promise to seek lenient
treatment. Therefore, to obtain the maximum advantage from his guilty plea, a
defendant may be well-advised to seek some down-grading of the charges
against him.24 Such a conclusion is especially true in view of the tendency of
judges to disregard the original indictment when sentencing an accused .2
THE GUILTY PLEA v. THE TRIAL: RATIONALES FOR ADjUSTING
SENTENCE
The reasons why courts feel the defendant's plea is a relevant factor in
sentencing may be separated into two major categories. In their answers to
the Questionnaire many judges expressed the belief that an accused pleading
guilty was generally less culpable, and thus less in need of punishment, than a
defendant convicted after trial. In addition, the view was asserted that a
defendant pleading guilty was entitled to some discount in punishment be-
cause of the aid of his plea in the efficient administration of justice. Several
judges emphasized that the plea was only one of numerous factors taken
into consideration in determining sentence, and that the weight given the plea
varied from case to case.2 6
The Guilty Plea as Evidence of Repentance
The predominant basis for a court's considering a defendant pleading guilty
less culpable than one denying guilt is the belief that a guilty plea demonstrates
the readiness of the accused to accept responsibility for his criminal acts.2 7
Judges feel that such a confession of wrongdoing evinces a repentant attitude,
23. Although a few judges indicated that they may be swayed by the prosecutor's
recommendation, the overwhelming majority of those reducing sentence following a
guilty plea gave reasons indicating that they were unaffected by the prosecutor's influence.
It is said, however, that normally the court will follow the prosecutor's recommendation.
Clemons v. United States, 137 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 1943).
24. Alternatively, he should attempt to obtain the prosecutor's recommendation for
probation since this might have considerable weight with the court. See Newman, supra
note 4, at 789. But see note 23 supra.
Federal courts may grant probation in any case except when the offense is punishable
by death or life imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1952). Similar discretion has been
given state courts. E.g., D~t. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4321 (Supp. 1954) ; N.H. Rv. STAT.
ANN. § 504.1 (Supp. 1955).
25. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
26. "Each case presents a different problem to the sentencing court; age, background,
nature of offense, prospects for rehabilitation, etc. all enter into the court's thinking."
QUESTIONNAIRE.
27. 46 replies e.xpressed this basic thought in one way or another. See also King,
Criminal Procedure from th e Viewpoint of the Trial Judge, 25 CONN. B.J. 202, 204-05
(1951).
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and thus represents an important step toward rehabilitation of the accused.2
A few judges added the qualification that a guilty plea would not be considered
evidence of reformation unless the accused had no prior criminal record.
A reduction in sentence following a guilty plea is consistent with the
rehabilitation theory of criminal punishment 29 only if such a plea is indicative
of remorse for prior criminal acts. Although a guilty plea may at times be
motivated by repentance, more often it would seem to represent exploitation
by the accused of the prosecutor's and court's reaction to such a plea.30 If a
defendant who acknowledged his guilt were aware that the plea could not
influence the extent of punishment, then perhaps his action might reflect a
renunciation of criminal propensities. But the very fact that a defendant
realizes a guilty plea may mitigate punishment impairs the value of the plea
as a gauge of character. Faced with convincing evidence of guilt, an accused
28. E.g.,
"A plea of guilty frequently is an expression of contrition and repentance on the
part of the defendant and is an indication of a purpose of amendment and reforma-
tion."
"His willingness to admit guilt usually indicates a degree of repentance which
should be considered. .. "
"[The defendant is] more inclined to face his situation realistically and maturely
and thus less likely to repeat the offense or to commit others."
QUESTIONNAIRES.
29. The purpose of the criminal law has been said to be to "protect socicty against
crime." Chandler, Latter-Day Procedures in the Sentencing and Treatment of Offenders
in the Federal Courts, 37 VA. L. REv. 825, 828 (1951). This protection may be effected
by deterring potential criminal offenders and/or by rehabilitating individuals convicted
of criminal conduct. Ibid. Since the sentencing trend is toward "individualization,"
"treatment" and punishment to fit the criminal rather than the crime, reformation appears
to be the more popular doctrine. See Hyde, Individualization in Criminal Punishment,
31 IowA L. REv. 200 (1946); Yankwich, The Federal Penal System, 10 F.R.D. 539, 542
(1951). Reformation would protect society by teaching the offender not to repeat his
criminal ways. This theory has been recognized as a prime goal of the sentencing function
in numerous cases. E.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949); France v.
State, 95 Okla. Crim. 244, 246, 244 P.2d 341, 343 (1952). For an explanation of deterrence
see note 33 infra.
The retribution doctrine of criminal sentencing would punish the defendant in vengeance
for his actions. Although retribution has fallen into disrepute as a theory of punishment,
see Chandler, supra at 828, there are still cases relying in part on this rationale. E.g..
State v. Meyer, 163 Ohio St. 279, 287, 126 N.E.2d 585, 589 (1955) ; Larkey v. State, 95
Okla. Crim. 338, 342, 245 P.2d 751, 755 (1952) ; see also Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 209, 224-29
(1955).
30. See Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REV. 385, 395-97
(1951); Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46
J. Cm. L., C. & P.S. 780, 783-84 (1956) ; see also MoL.EY, POLITICS AND CRIaMINAL PROSE-
cuTIoN 166-67 (1929) ; cf. Ward v. Uhited States, 116 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1940) (defendant
desired to withdraw plea of guilty when his "compromise" seemed dishonored) ; People
v. King, 1 Ill. 2d 496, 116 N.E.2d 623 (1953) (same) ; CLA K & SHULMAN, A STruDy or
LAw ADMIISTRATION IN CONNECTICUT 188 (1937) (many defendants who ultimately
pleaded guilty originally had pleaded not guilty).
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will probably enter a guilty plea for reasons of expediency, not principle.31
Moreover, while recidivists, poor prospects for reformation, will not be de-
terred from admitting guilt by the fear of impeaching their communal reputa-
tions, first offenders, though truly repentant, may well deny guilt in a desperate
effort to avoid the stigma of conviction.3
2
Nor can lenient treatment of defendants pleading guilty be justified in terms
of a deterrence theory of criminal punishment.-" It seems evident that the
goal of discouraging future criminal activity by punishing past offenders is
not served by awarding a reduced sentence to a person willing to admit his
crime. Indeed, the awareness that a guilty plea will probably result in clem-
ency may seriously undercut the deterrent effect of criminal prosecutions.
3 4
Commission of Perjury at Trial
A second reason why judges award a defendant convicted at trial a more
severe sentence than one pleading guilty is the belief that the former has
usually committed perjury in his defense. s 5 Of course this inference is drawn
31. Cf. Newman, supra note 30, at 783-84:
"The recidivists were both conviction wise and conviction susceptible in the dual
sense that they knew of the possibility of bargaining a guilty plea for a light
sentence and at the same time were vulnerable, because of their records, to threats
of the prosecutor to 'throw the book' at them unless they confessed."
32. In addition to suffering legal disabilities, see note 14 supra, a person convicted
of a crime is informally punished by the community at large. For example, a released
convict may have difficulty securing employment. PaRsoN Ass'N oF N.Y. ANN. REP'.
60 (1950).
In some cases first offenders may be hardened criminals who had been shrewd enough
to avoid apprehension. Such defendants may not be repentant of their criminal conduct
but rather may be contemplating return to a life of crime. Peterson, Rights and Needs
of the Criminal, 31 IowA L. Rav. 213, 217 (1946).
33. The theory of punishment as a deterrent is that the example of the defendant's
fate will serve to make others fearful of the consequences of criminal conduct. Tuohy,
Prosecution and Punishment for Crime, 31 IowA L. Racy. 205-06 (1946); see Law v.
State, 238 Ala. 428, 191 So. 803 (1939) (dictum); Frazier v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky.
467, 165 S.W.2d 33 (1942) ; State ex rel. Williams v. Rifle, 127 W. Va. 573, 34 S.E2d
21 (1945).
34. Dash, supra note 30, at 395-97.
35. 29 judges indicated that perjury was relied on as a basis for more severe punish-
ment of a defendant convicted at trial. The following statements are typical:
"The only factor which militates against a defendant appearing for sentence
after trial is the conviction which the court sometimes obtains from a trial that
the defendant has compounded his offense with perjury."
"Where a defendant takes the stand and patently commits perjury it usually
demonstrates that more severe corrective measures are necessary and this could
reflect itself in a longer sentence."
"When an accused stands trial, testifies in his own behalf and in the opinion of
the trial judge commits perjury, that is taken into account at the time of sentence
and the sentence is then more severe than if he had pled guilty."
QUESTIONNAIRMES.
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only when the defendant has taken the stand. 36 While some judges indicated
that an implied finding of perjury is predicated upon a review of the facts and
circumstances of each case, other judges appear to presume the occurence of
perjury from the mere fact of conviction.3 7 Regardless of the chain of reason-
ing employed, judges agreed that a defendant who was also a perjurer deserved
additional punishment.
The perjury rationale for increasing sentence may be viewed from two differ-
ent perspectives. It may be said that the judge is awarding the defendant a
given punishment for the crime of which he has been convicted, and then,
within the limits of his discretion to fix punishment for this offense, is imposing
an additional sentence because the defendant has committed the second crime
of perjury.38 Or the court may be said to consider the occurrence of perjury
as a culpable act bearing upon the character of the accused; accordingly, the
defendant is given a longer sentence for the crime of which he stands con-
victed because his perjurious conduct increases the difficulty of reformation.3 '
Both of these justifications seem unsound.
Penalizing the defendant for the substantive crime of perjury by increasing
the sentence for another offense contradicts basic tenets of criminal law. Since
perjury is properly punishable in a separate criminal proceeding,-" a summary
36. Because of the privilege against self-incrimination the defendant cannot be com-
pelled to testify. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; see also, e.g., Miss. CoNsr. art. 3, § 26;
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 15; OR. Co NsT. art 1, § 12.
Although defendants sometimes refuse to testify, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 97
F. Supp. 123 (S.D.W. Va. 1951), such cases are rare since a defendant who does not
take the stand will probably fatally prejudice his chances of acquittal. See note 90 infra.
37. See QUESTIONNAIRES.
38. See Peterson v. United States, 246 Fed. 118 (4th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 246
U.S. 661 (1918).
39. See Humes v. United States, 186 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1951); Peterson v.
United States, supra note 38.
In judging the defendant's prospects for reformation, courts consider other crimes
although they are not always evidenced by convictions. Schwellenbach, Information vs.
Intuition in the Imposition of Sentence, 27 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 52 (1943) ; Note, 101 U. PA.
L. REv. 257, 261-62, 270 (1952) ; see Chandler, Latter-Day Procedures in the Sentencing
and Treatment of Offenders in the Federal Courts, 37 VA. L. Rxv. 825, 830-35 (1951).
Statutes establish procedures for courts to obtain information about a convicted defendant's
past activity. E.g., FED. R. Cum . P. 32(c); IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-2213-14 (1956); LA.
REv. STAT. tit. 15, § 531 (Supp. 1955). For a description of the procedure used in prc-
sentence reports see FLA. PAROLE COMM'N ANN. REP. 2-3 (1943).
40. The perjury statutes do not exclude a defendant's perjury in his own behalf. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1952) ; DEL,. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 721-22 (Supp. 1954) ; REv. STAT.
ME. c. 135, § 1-4 (Supp. 1954). It will not violate double jeopardy limitations to prosecute
a defendant for perjury committed in his own behalf. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S.
58 (1951).
However defendants are rarely prosecuted for the commission of perjury at a trial
terminating in their conviction. But see ibid. Cases in which defendants acquitted in a
criminal action are later prosecuted for perjury are probably much more common. E.g.,
ibid.; United States v. Slutzky, 79 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1935); State v. Vandemark, 77
Conn. 201, 58 AUt. 715 (1904).
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adjudication by the court of the defendant's guilt is an inadequate substitute
for the constitutional safeguards inherent in a new indictment and jury trial.
41
Moreover, even though the defendant's conviction must be taken as a re-
pudiation of his testimony, the judgment in the initial case would undoubtedly
be inadmissible evidence in a subsequent perjury proceeding.42  In light of
this doctrine, the practice of conclusively presuming the commission of perjury
from the fact of conviction is particularly suspect.
43
A defendant is not always entitled to a separate jury trial on the issue of
perjury; lying under oath in a judicial proceeding may at times be punishable
as criminal contempt.44 Under rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, criminal contenipt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies
that the conduct constituting the contempt was committed in the presence of
the court.4 5  However, the Supreme Court has held that perjury standing
alone does not "obstruct the administration of justice" and hence does not by
itself constitute criminal contempt under the applicable federal statute.46 To
be punishable, the perjury must be such that it blocks the performance of
41. Since perjury is a substantive crime, see statutes cited in note 40 supra, in
prosecutions for perjury the defendant must be accorded full constitutional guarantees.
42. WHARTON, EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ISSUas § 602(a) (8th ed. 1880) ; see Starnes
v. State, 125 Tex. Crim. 21, 66 S.W.2d 335 (1933) ; see also United States v. Burkhardt,
31 Fed. 141 (C.C. Ore. 1887) ; Spearman v. State, 68 Tex. Grim. 449, 152 S.W. 915 (1913).
The judgment roll in a civil case is inadmissible in a subsequent perjury prosecution
as evidence of the commission of perjury at the first trial. WHARTON, CkimiNAL EVIDE CE
§ 639 (12th ed. 1955) (collecting cases). The judgment roll will be admissible to show the
occurrence of the proceeding, the jurisdiction of the court, the giving of testimony and
its materiality. People v. Reitz, 86 Cal. App. 791, 796, 261 Pac. 526, 528 (1927). When
the judgment roll is admitted for these limited purposes, the findings and decrees are
excluded. See State v. King, 165 Ore. 26, 37, 103 P.2d 751, 755-56 (1940).
43. A former conviction would not collaterally estop a defendant in a prosecution for
perjury from denying that he had sworn falsely at the first trial. Developments in
the Law--Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 877 n.441 (1952).
44. See, generally, Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 846, 848-51 (1956); Note, Falsification
as Contempt, 7 VAND. L. REV. 272 (1954).
Some false testimony which might not be punishable as a substantive crime of perjury
can be punished as contempt because in some respects the requirements of perjury are
more difficult to satisfy. The principal distinction appears to be that whereas any false
swearing may qualify as contempt, perjury is committed only if the lie was material. Id.
at 273, 280. But see United States v. Talbot, 133 F. Supp. 120, 128 (D. Alaska 1955)
(defendant acquitted of criminal contempt, the court holding, inter alia, that the testimony
was not material); People v. Williams, 348 Ill. App. 224, 108 N.E.2d 736 (1952).
Testimony is material if it could have influenced the tribunal in determining the issues
before it. Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
842 (1945) ; United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956) ; People v. Sage-
horn, 140 Adv. Cal. App. 2d 134, 143, 294 P.2d 1062, 1069 (1956).
45. "A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he
aw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual
presence of the court." FED. R. CRim. P. 42(a).
46. In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945) ; Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919).
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1952) provides:
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judicial duty.47 Although the application of this doctrine has evoked consider-
able confusion,48 it is questionable whether the requisite obstruction of justice
could be said to occur when the defendant has been convicted in spite of his
perjured testimony.49 In addition, cases have indicated that the bona fide belief
of a presiding judge that a witness has committed perjury does not by itself
justify summary punishment of the contemnor without due notice and hearing 0°
When a judge increases the sentence awarded for the charged crime as a
penalty for perjury not summarily punishable as contempt, he utilizes his dis-
cretion to accomplish a result he could not have effected directly. The rigid
requirements which must be met for perjury to qualify as criminal contempt
reflect the policy that the contempt power should be strictly applied,r' since
the contemnor is sentenced without the normal safeguards of procedural due
process.5 2 Such a policy is jeopardized when a judge increases sentence for
another crime to discipline a defendant whose perjured testimony, though not
qualifying as contempt, has been felt to offend the dignity of the court.
Assuming that the perjury of the accused would be subject to punishment
as criminal contempt, the court that awards a more severe sentence on the
basis of the defendant's commission of perjury may be said to substitute one
form of summary punishment for another concededly within its power. At
first glance, such a practice does not seem objectionable. However, it should
"A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprison-
ment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
"(1) -Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice;
"(2) . . .;
"(3) ....
47. "The (federal] courts say there must be 'defiance of the court' or a 'blocking of
the inquiry.' " Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 846, 849 (1956).
48. There have been several reversals in the federal courts because of misapplication
of "obstruction" principles. Ibid.
In addition, reversals for erroneous application of false swearing contempt standards
in the state courts are frequent. E.g., People v. Harrison, 403 Ill. 320, 86 N.E.2d 208
(1949) ; In re Scott, 342 Mich. 614, 71 N.W.2d 71 (1955) ; Fawick Airflex Co. v. Local
735, United Electrical Workers, CIO, 87 Ohio App. 371, 92 N.E.2d 436, appeals dismnissed,
153 Ohio St. 589, 92 N.E.2d 689, 154 Ohio St. 106, 93 N.E.2d 409, 154 Ohio St. 205, 93
N.E.2d 769 (1950).
Punishment of perjury as contempt appears to be a highly disfavored remedy. See ibid.
Restrictions on the broad use of the contempt power have been urged in order that
witnesses may not be discouraged from testifying. Nelles, The Summary Power to
Punish for Contempt, 31 CoLum. L. REv. 956, 969-70 (1931).
49. Cf. Ii re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945).
50. State courts add the requirement that the court have "judicial knowledge" that
the testimony was in fact false. Judicial knowledge may be said to exist, for example,
when testimony conflicts with uncontrovertible documentary evidence. Note, 7 VAND.
L. Ray. 272, 278-79 & n.55 (1954) (collecting cases). See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 275-76 (1948); Annot., 93 L. Ed. 578, 583-84 (1950).
51. Nelles, supra note 48, at 969-70; Comment, 65 YAIu L.J. 846, 850-51 (1956);
Note, 7 VAND. L. Rxv. 272, 273-74 (1954).
52. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) ; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273-78 (1948).
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be noted that a sentence within the legal limits provided for the proven crime
is not usually subject to appellate review.53 Accordingly, a defendant whose
sentence has been increased as a penalty for perjury felt to constitute contempt
is denied the right of appeal which he would have enjoyed if the court had
followed the standard procedure for summary punishment of contempt.54 Such
a deprivation is particularly significant in view of the frequent misapplication
by trial courts of the standards for punishing perjury as criminal contempt. 5
Punishment of a defendant's commission of perjury by augmenting sentence
for another crime denies him constitutional and statutory safeguards which
he would enjoy if a separate criminal proceeding or the criminal contempt
procedure were employedYi0 Yet when a judge, in the exercise of his discretion,
imposes a more severe sentence on the basis of perjured testimony, it may be
contended that he is not punishing perjury as such, but is merely considering
the occurrence of perjury as an indication of the defendant's prospects for
reformation. In determining sentence, a judge may constitutionally take cog-
nizance of a wide variety of information bearing upon the character and back-
ground of the convicted defendant. In Williams v. New York,57 the Supreme
Court held that a statute 58 which authorized submission to a judge of a pre-
53. "[In the absence of a specific statutory grant of power an appellate court will
not reduce a sentence which is within statutory limits merely because it is, in the judg-
ment of that court, excessive." Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal: I,
37 COLUm. L. REv. 521, 522 (1937).
Accordingly federal appellate courts hold that they have no power to reduce a sentence
legally imposed within statutory limits. E.g., Brown v. United States, 222 F.2d 293, 298-99
(9th Cir. 1955); Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930). However at one
time the courts exercised such a power, based on statutory authority. See United States
v. Wynn, 11 Fed. 57 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1882); Bates v. United States, 10 Fed. 92, 96
(C.C.N.D. Ill. 1881); see also Freeman v. United States, 243 Fed. 353, 357 (9th Cir.
1917), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 600 (1918). The question should not be treated as fore-
closed because in Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 745 (1952), the Supreme Court,
when faced with the argument that under the circumstances the death penalty for treason
was unreasonable, did not disclaim appellate power to reduce sentence but instead ruled
that the punishment was reasonable. But see Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
305 (1932).
In some states appellate power to revise legal sentences is found, although frequently
the reviewing court insists upon a showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court. See,
e.g., State v. Telavera, 76 Ariz. 183, 186, 261 P.2d 997, 1000 (1953) ; State v. Constanzo,
76 Idaho 19, 27, 276 P.2d 959, 963 (1954); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 380 Pa. 52, 110
A.2d 216 (1955) ; see also Sobeloff, A Recommendation for Appellate Review of Criminal
Sentences, 21 BROoKLYN L. REV. 2 (1954).
54. An order adjudging a defendant: guilty of criminal contempt is appealable. It re
Merchants' Stock and Grain Co., 223 U.S. 639, 642 (1912) ; In re Manufacturers Trading
Corp., 194 F.2d 948, 955 (6th Cir. 1952) (dictum).
55. See note 48 supra.
56. See text at notes 45-50 supra.
57. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
58. N.Y. CREM. CODE § 482:
"Before ... sentence the court shall cause the defendant's previous criminal
record to be submitted to it, including any reports that may have been made as a
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sentencing report describing the past life, habits and mental and moral pro-
pensities of the accused was not offensive to due process, though the defendant
had no right to confront and cross-examine the investigators who compiled the
report.59 The bona fide belief of a trial judge that a defendant has committed
perjury would seem as reliable a source of information as the data permitted
under the Williams doctrine.60 But, even though the judge's belief that per-
jury has occurred may constitutionally influence his judgment of the accused's
character, the question remains whether the commission of perjury demon-
strates a greater need for rehabilitation.
The prior criminal conduct of a defendant awaiting sentence is acknowl-
edged to be a gauge of his antisocial propensities, and hence useful in predict-
ing the sentence necessary to effect reformation.0 1 Accordingly judges con-
sider, in addition to convictions, other purported illegal activities of the
accused as revealed by pre-sentencing reports or other sources of information.-
2
Viewed from this perspective, perjury apparently committed at trial may be
classified an illegal activity properly incorporated into the defendant's criminal
record. And, since past criminal behavior is a factor influencing length of
sentence, a pro tanto increase in the punishment accorded a defendant suspected
of perjury may at first glance seem defensible.
63
However, when a judge awards a defendant believed to be a perjurer a more
severe sentence than he would have given a defendant pleading guilty to the
same offense but otherwise possessing an identical criminal record, such a dis-
result of a mental, phychiatric [sic] or physical examination of such person, and
may seek any information that will aid the court in determining the proper treat-
ment of such defendant." (Emphasis added.)
See also note 39 supra.
59. 337 U.S. at 245.
60. Williams v. New York does not hold that due process is inapplicable in sentencing.
Rather it holds that in the light of modern penological concepts the New York pre-
sentencing procedure is reasonable. Id. at 252 n.18. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736 (1948). Under Townsend the sentencing court must not base its decision on in-
formation "extensively and materially false" which the defendant cannot refute. Id. at
741 ; see Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1955) ; see, generally, Note, 101
U. P.. L. REv. 257, 263-71 (1952).
61. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402,
253 P.2d 203, 207 (1953) ; see note 39 supra and accompanying text.
62. See Pence v. United States, 219 F.2d 70 (10th Cir. 1955) , People %,. Rummer-
field, 4 Ill. 2d 29, 122 N.E.2d 170 (1954); Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 92 A.2d 57o
(1952). However the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, dispense with the pre-
sentence report. United States v. Schwenke, 221 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1955). But see State
v. Culver, 40 N.J. Super. 427, 123 A.2d 383 (App. Div. 1956) (dictum).
63. It should be noted, however, that in the federal courts the defendant as a matter
of right can insist that the pre-sentence report be disclosed and hence can refute iia'-
curacies. Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1955). Contra, State v. Moore,
108 A.2d 675 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954) (state practice). In contrast if a seitence is increased
because of supposed perjury, the defendant may never know the reason for his additional
punishment since no explanation need be given.
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crimination is justified only if the perjury indicates a distinction in the char-
acter of the two defendants. An individual willing to commit a crime would
quite likely have no moral scruples against subsequently denying under oath
its commission in order to escape punishment. In the usual case, a defendant
is motivated to admit guilt not by an aversion to perjury but by the realization
that his plea may be effective in-mitigating sentence.64 For an accused con-
fronted with incriminating evidence, a guilty plea may appear to be a far more
profitable choice than an ineffective false denial at trial. When perjury is
avoided for reasons of expediency, not principle, it is debatable whether the
defendant pleading guilty is a better prospect for reformation than one who
perjures himself at trial in an unsuccessful effort to obtain acquittal. On the
other hand, the defendant whose sentence has been increased on the basis of
suspected perjury has, in the opinion of the court, actually perjured himself;
his counterpart who pleaded guilty may have entertained the propensity to
commit perjury, but did not in fact do so. Thus in evaluating the character
of the two defendants, it may sometimes be reasonable to give greater weight
to the commission of perjury than to the mere propensity to commit perjury.65
In the case of a first offender, it would seem unreasonable to presume a
greater need for reformation solely.because the accused has given perjured
testimony in his defense. 66 Such false swearing, rather than demonstrative of
future criminal propensities, may be prompted by an ardent desire to avoid
the loss of community standing accompanying an initial conviction. 67 Thus
the defendant may still be an excellent prospect for rehabilitation, despite his
conduct at trial.
Assertion of Frivolous Defense
Some judges reported that a defendant pleading not guilty was awarded
a more severe sentence than a defendant pleading guilty only if the court felt
that the demand for trial was not made in good faith but was essentially 'a
64. See Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice,
46 J. Clm. L., C. & P.S. 780, 783-84 (1956) ; see also In re Smith, 162 Ohio St. 58, 120
N.E.2d 736 (1954); Maxwell v. State, 292 P.2d 181 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956); Common-
wealth v. Cole, 384 Pa. 40, 119 A2d 253 (1956) ; Hobson v. Youell, 177 Va. 906, 914-15,
15 S.E.2d 76, 79 (1941).
65. Criminal intent alone does not constitute a crime; there must be some act ac-
companying the intent. MILLER, CRTMINAL LAW § 14 (1934); see People v. Jelke, 1
N.Y.2d 321, 330, 135 N.E.2d 213, 218-19 (1956): Commonwealth v. Willard, 179 Pa.
Super. 368, 116 A.2d 751 (1955). Therefore it may be held consistent with criminal theory
to give greater evidentiary weight to an actual act than to a frame of mind when
determining the appropriate punishment for another crime. Cf. Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949) (trial court relied on evidence of other crimes but also described
defendant as a " 'menace to society.' ").
66. First offenders may of course be given more lenient sentences than recidivists.
However, the Questionnaires suggest that a first offender who pleads guilty will much
more likely be given clemency than one who has been convicted at trial.
67. See note 14 supra; note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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dilatory tactic.68 The view was expressed that a defendant faced with over-
whelming evidence of guilt who presented a frivolous defense in a desperate
gamble to sway a jury deserved additional punishment. In contrast, an accused
whose defense raised a substantial question of law or fact was accorded the
same sentencing treatment as was given defendants pleading guilty. Since
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury does not distinguish between
dilatory and substantial defenses, 69 the defendant whose punishment has been
increased for demanding what the court considers a useless trial is in effect
being penalized for asserting his constitutional rights. It is questionable whether
a not guilty plea can ever be fairly deemed "dilatory," since it accords with the
presumption of innocence which the prosecution must rebut beyond a reason-
able doubt. 70 In addition, the judicial determination that a defense was frivo-
lous is made when the accused has already been convicted; any defense appears
less meritorious after it has been rejected.71
Revelation of Circumstances of Crime
Four judges answering the Questionnaire suggested that a guilty plea may
contribute to a shorter sentence because the brutal circumstances frequently
accompanying criminal activity are not emphasized by the prosecution, and
vividly recounted at trial.7 2 Such a position implies that the pre-sentencing
report on a defendant pleading guilty either does not describe the details of
the crime or lacks the dramatic thrust inherent in testimony. Though judges
are naturally swayed by emotional responses, 73 the means by which a defend-
ant is convicted cannot alter the actual nature of his criminal conduct. Theo-
68. 11 judges gave explanations similar to the ones below:
"[W]e do not penalize the defendant for standing trial if he has a real or reason-
able defense--otherwise we do-as a penalty for needlessly taking up time and
creating expense."
"No person should ever be given a longer sentence because he insists upon a
trial unless it is apparent that he is guilty and is just attempting to win an acquittal
at any cost."
QUESTIONNAIRES.
69. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI; see Ex parte Qurin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942). Nor is any
distinction made by constitutional provisions existing in all states. See, e.g., Mo. CONsT.
art. I § 18(a) ; N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 13; Wis. CoNsr. art. I, § 7.
70. For statements of the presumption of innocence see, e.g., People v. Sobczak, 344
Mich. 465, 73 N.W.2d 921 (1955); State v. Pietranton, 84 S.E.2d 774, 787-89 (W. Va.
1954).
71. See United States v. Konovsky, 202 F.2d 721, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1953).
72. "It must be kept in mind that ordinarily on a plea of guilty the defendant's case
is presented in its most favorable light . .. .
"When a man pleads guilty all the details of his crime are rarely presented
to the judge and a moderate, average sentence is imposed."
QUESTIONNAnMS.
73. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13-14 (1954); Philadelphia Evening
Bulletin, July 10, 1956, p. 1, col. 4 (a judge disqualified himself from a criminal trial
because so emotionally involved he "could show no sympathy, no mercy or anything else").
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retically, the circumstances of the crime should be given the same weight in
evaluating the character of the accused regardless of his plea.7
4
Role of the Plea in Efficient Criminal Administration
Many judges expressed the belief that a defendant pleading guilty should
receive some reduction in the gravity of sentence because of the role of guilty
pleas in the efficient and economical administration of criminal law. 7 5 When
a defendant admits the commission of a crime, the government is saved the
time and money that a potentially lengthy trial entails. Guilty pleas help keep
crowded criminal dockets current and enable other defendants pleading not
guilty to obtain speedy trials. 76 Such reasons for mitigating sentence are
predicated upon practical administrative considerations and do not reflect the
belief that a defendant who pleads guilty is a better prospect for reformation.
77
The practice of promoting efficient justice by judicial adjustment of sen-
tences to encourage guilty pleas must be viewed in terms of the court's
function in criminal administration. While the prosecutor is charged with
the statutory duty of , representing the state in criminal proceedings,7 8 the
judge is not an advocate.70 Vested with discretion to designate punishment
for criminal offenders, the judge must exercise his authority impartially,
8 0
having "no interest other than the pursuit of justice."8 1 Modern penal theory
holds that the interests of both society and the defendant are served by adjust-
74. Hence even after a plea of guilty the court may attempt to ascertain the cir-
cumstances of the crime. See Zeff v. Sanford, 31 F. Supp. 736, 737 (N.D. Ga.),
aff'd per curiam, 114 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1940).
75. 34 judges concurred in the sentiments expressed below:
"I make them a concession for pleading guilty for two reasons: (1) it saves
the Government a great deal of time and money; (2) I believe it is in the best
interests of society that criminal calendars be caught up as closely as possible, and
by eliminating a great many trials the other defendants will obtain a more speedy
trial."
"The fact that the Government has been saved the expense of trial is con-
sidered."
QUESTIONNAIRES.
76. See text at notes 6-8 supra; King, Criminal Procedure From the Viewpoint of
the Trial Judge, 25 CONN. B.J. 202, 204-05 (1951) ; Note, 33 CORNm L.Q. 407, 408-09
(1948).
77. "Though a plea of guilty usually effects a discount because the government
has saved costs of trial-it should not in legal theory have this effect. Dollar
saving doesn't protect society or rehabilitate, and it leads to a sentence 'bargaining
atmosphere.' " (Emphasis added.)
QUESTIONNAIRE.
78. See statutes cited in note 6 supra.
79. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942); Wyzanski,
A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291-93 (1952).
80. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) ; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927).
81. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).
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ing sentence to reflect the individual's prospects for rehabilitation.8 2 But
when defendants guilty of the same crime are awarded different sentences
for administrative reasons, such a discrimination cannot be justified in terms
of individual culpability.83 An accused who receives a harsher punishment
than the court would have decreed had he waived a costly and time-consuming
trial pays a judicially imposed penalty for exercising constitutionally guaran-
teed rights. Nor can such an objection be overcome by the rationale that
judges, rather than penalizing defendants convicted at trial, instead reward
those who plead guilty.8 4 This distinction is illusory; the fact is that, whether
by means of forfeiting a reward or incurring a penalty, a demand for trial will
result in a more severe punishment than would be imposed following a guilty
plea. In view of the concepts of impartiality and fairness which have tra-
ditionally guided the exercise of the judicial function,8 5 it is submitted that en-
couragement of guilty pleas by sentencing concessions is more censurable
when practiced by courts than by prosecutors.8 6
.SENTENCING POLICY AND THE INNOCENT DEFENDANT
The greatest danger inherent in the policy of utilizing the plea as a factor
in sentencing is that innocent men will be influenced to plead guilty.8 7 Con-
fronted with the probability that conviction after trial will substantially enhance
punishment,88 a defendant may decide that assertion of his innocence entails
too much of a risk.8 9 The greater the potential discrepancy in the sentence
to be imposed following trial convictions and guilty pleas, the more will be
magnified the fear of standing trial. A defendant may be especially reluctant
to plead not guilty when he has a criminal record, for then his chances of
successfully establishing innocence are considerably diminished. Under preva-
82. See note 29 supra.
83. Even if the court attempts to fit the punishment to the crime rather than to the
individual, see State v. English, 242 Iowa 248, 252, 46 N.W.2d 13, 15 (1951), the
administrative convenience rationale is unacceptable because cooperation subsequent to
the crime does not alter the criminal act.
84. "A not guilty plea does not induce a more severe sentence. A guilty plea induces
a less severe sentence." QUESTIONNARE. See also King, supra note 76, at 204-05.
85. The right of the accused to an impartial judge "is a concept of ancient origin
inherent in the common law." Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63, 82, 51 N.E.2d 848, 855 (1943):
see also notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text.
86. Cf. Donnelly, Unconvicting the Innocent, 6 VAND. L. REV. 20, 38 (1952).
87. For a refutation of the assumption that an innocent man will never confess to a
crime he has not committed, see 3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940); Note, Vohl-
tary False Confessions: A Neglected Area in Criminal Administration, 28 IiD. L.J. 374
passim (1953).
88. See text at notes 17-21 sutpra.
89. Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46
J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 780, 783-84 (1956). This might be particularly true in cases in
which the defendant has been accused of a felony but can plead guilty to a misdemeanor.
In such a case the defendant can avoid the local habitual offenders' statute. See note
15 supra.
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lent evidentiary rules, the defendant's criminal past may be brought out at
trial by one means or another, with consequent prejudice to his defense.90 In
addition the accused may have a weak alibi, corroborated only by witnesses
of questionable character.
The judicial practice of reducing sentence following guilty pleas works
a subtle coercion upon the defendant, incompatible with the constitutional
guarantee of due process."' The Supreme Court has held that a conviction
will be invalidated if based upon a guilty plea which is the product of mental
coercion.0 2 While it is doubtful that a guilty plea could successfully be voided
on the ground that sentencing procedure discriminated against the defendant
demanding trial, nevertheless the pleader's freedom of choice is seriously in-
hibited when he is aware of such differentials in punishment.93
CONCLUSION
Judges have indicated that a defendant pleading not guilty may incur addi-
tional punishment because he displays an uncooperative attitude, commits
perjury or asserts a frivolous defense at trial, reveals the circumstances of his
crime, or does not contribute to the efficient administration of justice. Ex-
90. Evidence of a defendant's prior crimes is inadmissible to show a propensity toward
criminal conduct. 'MCCoEICK, EVIDENCE § 157 (1954). However if the accused puts his
character in issue his prior crimes may be disclosed on cross-exaiiination of his character
witnesses. Id. § 158. Furthermore if the defendant testifies, his past criminal conduct may
be used to impeach his veracity as a witness. Id. § 157. Though the evidence may nominally
be introduced only for this purpose, it is almost certain to be prejudicial on the ultimate
issue. Id. at 93-94; Note, 37 MINN. L. Rav. 608, 617 (1953). If the defendant fails to
testify, "his silence will adversely effect him." United States ex reL. Caminito v. Murphy,
222 F.2d 698, 703 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896 (1955). In addition prior crimes
may be used as direct evidence against a defendant if their introduction qualifies under
one of the numerous exceptions to the general exclusionary rule. McCoRMICx, EVMENCE
§ 157 (1954).
91. Due process of law is denied if a defendant is convicted on a coerced plea of
guilty. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942) ; Behrens v. Hironimus, 166 F.2d
245, 247 (4th Cir. 1948) ; People v. Heirens, 4 IlL 2d 131, 141, 122 N.E.2d 231, 237 (1954),
cort. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955); see Pennsylvania ex reL Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S.
116, 118 (1956).
"[A]n accused who has been convicted on a plea of guilty induced by threats,
promises and intimidation . . . has been deprived of constitutional rights to the
same extent as a person who has been convicted upon a confession obtained
through coercion."
Behrens v. Hironimus, supra at 247.
92. Waley v. Johnston, supra note 91; see Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy,
supra note 91.
93. The language of some cases supports the contention that convictions based on guilty
pleas should be constitutionally voided if the sentencing procedure awards a reduced
sentence to a defendant pleading guilty. E.g., "A plea of guilty is involuntary when made
under such inducements as would cause an innocent man to confess guilt." Palmer v.
Cranor, 45 Wash. 2d 278, 282, 273 P.2d 985, 988 (1954) ; see 3 WiGmoRE, EvDENCE § 824,
at 250-51 (3d ed. 1940) (showing similar standards are used for excluding confessions).
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amination of each of these rationales discloses imposing constitutional, statu-
tory and policy weaknesses. Inherent in the practice of awarding reduced
sentences following guilty pleas is discrimination-discrimination against the
innocent defendant induced to plead guilty, and discrimination against the
guilty defendant punished more severely than one committing the same crime
and equally in need of reformation. Since only a minority of judges ignore
the plea in determining sentence,94 and since the judges who do consider the
plea disagree on its relative importance, defendants pleading guilty will receive
unequal benefit, depending upon the individual practice of the court. In view
of the inequities that the policy fosters, courts should not award sentencing
concessions to defendants who plead guilty.95
94. 47 judges indicated that the plea was not a relevant factor in sentencing.
"In my opinion it is not wise or fair to make a practice of imposing less severe
sentences on defendants who plead guilty. To do so as an established practice acts
as a measure of inducement to defendants to plead guilty in doubtful cases where,
on a trial, they might have a reasonable chance of acquittal."
"The nature of the plea, guilty or not guilty, in my opinion should have no
bearing upon the degree of punishment. Otherwise one would plead 'not guilty'
knowing that more of a hazard was assumed than if a guilty plea was made. This
is a form of coercion."
QUESTIONNAIRES.
95. "[Probably the greatest weakness in the administration of criminal justice in
the courts of the United States . . . [is] the unfairness and injustice arising from
the wide disparity in the sentences meted out by the federal judges .... .
Address by Warren Olney III, Assistant Att'y Gen., Crim. Div., Dep't of Justice, Los
Angeles, Cal., Sept. 20, 1956.
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